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Abstract
Variable annuities, as a class of retirement income products, allow equity market expo-
sure for a policyholder’s retirement fund with electable additional guarantees to limit
the downside risk of the market. Management fees and guarantee insurance fees are
charged respectively for the market exposure and for the protection from the down-
side risk. We investigate the impact of management fees on the pricing of variable
annuity guarantees under optimal withdrawal strategies. Two optimal strategies, from
policyholder’s and from insurer’s perspectives, are respectively formulated and the cor-
responding pricing problems are solved using dynamic programming. Our results show
that when management fees are present, the two strategies can deviate significantly
from each other, leading to a substantial difference of the guarantee insurance fees.
This provides a possible explanation of lower guarantee insurance fees observed in the
market. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate our results.
Keywords: variable annuity guarantees, guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits,
management fees, stochastic optimal control, PDE, finite difference
1. Introduction
Variable annuities (VA) with guarantees of living and death benefits are offered
by wealth management and insurance companies worldwide to assist individuals in
managing their pre-retirement and post-retirement financial plans. These products take
advantages of market growth while provide a protection of the savings against market
downturns. Similar guarantees are also available for life insurance policies (Bacinello
and Ortu [1]). The VA contract cash flows received by the policyholder are linked to
the investment portfolio choice and performance (e.g. the choice of mutual fund and its
strategy) while traditional annuities provide a pre-defined income stream in exchange
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for a lump sum payment. Holders of VA policies are required to pay management fees
regularly during the term of the contract for the wealth management services.
A variety of VA guarantees, also known as VA riders, can be elected by policyholders
at the cost of additional insurance fees. Common examples of VA guarantees include
guaranteed minimum accumulation benefit (GMAB), guaranteed minimum withdrawal
benefit (GMWB), guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMIB) and guaranteed min-
imum death benefit (GMDB), as well as a combination of them. These guarantees,
generically denoted as GMxB, provide different types of protection against market
downturns, shortfall of savings due to longevity risk or assurance of stability of income
streams. Precise specifications of these products can vary across categories and issuers.
See Bauer et al. [2], Ledlie et al. [18], Kalberer and Ravindran [16] for an overview of
these products.
The Global Financial Crisis during 2007-08 led to lasting adverse market conditions
such as low interest rates and asset returns as well as high volatilities for VA providers.
Under these conditions, the VA guarantees become more valuable, and the fulfillment of
the corresponding required liabilities become more demanding. The post-crisis market
conditions have called for effective hedging of risks associated with the VA guarantees
(Sun et al. [26]). As a consequence, the need for accurate estimation of hedging costs
of VA guarantees has become increasingly important. Such estimations consist of risk-
neutral pricing of future cash flows that must be paid by the insurer to the policyholder
in order to fulfill the liabilities of the VA guarantees.
There have been a number of contributions in the academic literature considering
the pricing of VA guarantees. A range of numerical methods are considered, including
standard and regression-based Monte Carlo (Huang and Kwok [14]), partial differential
equation (PDE) and direct integration methods (Milevsky and Salisbury [21], Dai et al.
[8], Chen and Forsyth [4], Bauer et al. [2], Luo and Shevchenko [19, 20], Forsyth and
Vetzal [10], Shevchenko and Luo [25]). A comprehensive overview of numerical methods
for the pricing of VA guarantees is provided in Shevchenko and Luo [24].
In this article we focus on GMWB which provides a guaranteed withdrawal amount
per year until the maturity of the contract regardless of the investment performance.
The guaranteed withdrawal amount is determined such that the initial investment is
returned over the life of the contract. When pricing GMWB, one typically assume
either a pre-determined (static) policyholder behavior in withdrawal and surrender, or
an active (dynamic) strategy where the policyholder “optimally” decides the amount
of withdrawal at each withdrawal date depending on the information available at that
date.
One of the most debated aspects in the pricing of GMWB with active withdrawal
strategies is the policyholders’ withdrawal behaviors (Cramer et al. [6], Chen and
Forsyth [4], Moenig and Bauer [22], Forsyth and Vetzal [10]). It is often customary
to refer to the withdrawal strategy that maximizes the expected liability, or the hedg-
ing cost, of the VA guarantee as the “optimal” strategy. Even though such a strategy
underlies the worst case scenario for the VA provider with the highest hedging cost, it
may not coincide with the real-world behavior of the policyholder. Nevertheless, the
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price of the guarantee under this strategy provides an upper bound of hedging cost from
the insurer’s perspective, which is often referred to as the “value” of the guarantee. The
real-world behaviors of policyholders often deviate from this “optimal” strategy, as is
noted in Moenig and Bauer [22]. Different models have been proposed to account for
the real-world behaviors of policyholders, including the reduced-form exercise rules of
Ho et al. [13], and the subjective risk neutral valuation approach taken by Moenig and
Bauer [22]. In particular, it is concluded by Moenig and Bauer [22] that a subjective
risk-neutral valuation methodology that takes different tax structures into consideration
is in line with the corresponding findings from empirical observations.
Similar to the tax consideration in Moenig and Bauer [22], the management fee is
a form of market friction that would affect policyholders’ rational behaviors. However,
management fees are rarely considered in the VA pricing literature. When the man-
agement fee is zero and deterministic withdrawal behavior is assumed, Hyndman and
Wenger [15] and Fung et al. [11] show that risk-neutral pricing of guaranteed withdrawal
benefits in both a policyholder’s and an insurer’s perspectives will result in the same
fair insurance fee. Few studies that take management fees into account in the pricing
of VA guarantees include Be´langer et al. [3], Chen et al. [5] and Kling et al. [17]. In
these studies, fair insurance fees are considered from the insurer’s perspective with the
given management fees. The important question of how the management fees as a form
of market friction will impact withdrawal behaviors of the policyholder, and hence the
hedging cost for the insurer, is yet to be examined in a dynamic withdrawal setting.
The main goal of the paper is to address this question.
The paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, we consider two
pricing approaches based on the policyholder’s and the insurer’s perspective. In the
literature it is most often the case that only an insurer’s perspective is considered,
which might result in mis-characterisation of the policyholder’s withdrawal strategies.
Second, we characterize the impact of management fees on the pricing of GWMB,
and demonstrate that the two afore-mentioned pricing perspectives lead to different
fair insurance fees due to the presence of management fees. In particular, the fair
insurance fees from the policyholder’s perspective is lower than those from the insurer’s
perspective. This provides a possible justification of lower insurance fees observed in
the market. Third, the sensitivity of the fair insurance fees to management fees under
different market conditions and contract parameters are investigated and quantified
through numerical examples.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the contract details of
the GMWB guarantee together with its pricing formulation under a stochastic optimal
control framework. Section 3 derives the policyholder’s value function under the risk-
neutral pricing approach, followed by the insurer’s net liability function in Section 4. In
Section 5 we compare the two withdrawal strategies that maximize the policyholder’s
value and the insurer’s liability, respectively, and discuss the role of the management
fees in their relations. Section 6 demonstrates our approaches via numerical examples.
Section 7 concludes with remarks and discussion.
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2. Formulation of the GMWB pricing problem
We begin with the setup of the framework for the pricing of GMWB and describe
the features of this type of guarantees. The problem is formulated under a general
setting so that the resulting pricing formulation can be applied to different GMWB
contract specifications. Besides the general setting, we also consider a very specific
simple GMWB contract, which will be subsequently used for illustration purposes in
numerical experiments presented in Section 6.
The VA policyholder’s retirement fund is usually invested in a managed wealth
account that is exposed to financial market risks. A management fee is usually charged
for this investment service. In addition, if GMWB is elected, extra insurance fees
will be charged for the protection offered by the guarantee provider (insurer). We
assume the wealth account guaranteed by the GMWB is subject to continuously charged
proportional management fees, paid to an independent wealth manager other than the
insurer. This assumption implies that the management fees cannot be used to fund
the hedging portfolio for the GMWB guarantee. The sole purpose of management
fees is to compensate for the fund management services provided, and should not be
confused with the hedging cost of the guarantee. The cost of hedging, on the the hand,
is paid by proportional insurance fees continuously charged to the wealth account. The
fair insurance fee rate, or the fair fees in short, refers to the minimal insurance fee rate
required to fund the hedging portfolio, or the replicating portfolio, so that the guarantee
provider can eliminate the market risk associated with the selling of the guarantees.
We consider the situation where a policyholder purchases the GMWB rider in order
to protect his wealth account that tracks an equity index S(t) at time t ∈ [0, T ], where 0
and T correspond to the inception and expiry dates. The equity index account is mod-
elled under the risk-neutral probability measure Q following the stochastic differential
equation (SDE)
dS(t) = S(t) (r(t)dt+ σ(t)dB(t)) , t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
where r(t) is the risk-free short interest rate, σ(t) is the volatility of the index, which
are made time-dependent and can be stochastic, and B(t) is a standard Q-Brownian
motion modelling the uncertainty of the index. Here, we follow standard practices in
the literature of VA guarantee pricing by modelling under the risk-neutral probability
measure Q, which allows the pricing of stochastic cash flows as taking the risk-neutral
expectation of the discounted cash flows. The risk-neutral probability measure Q exists
if the underlying financial market satisfies certain “no-arbitrage” conditions. For details
on risk-neutral pricing, see, e.g., Delbaen and Schachermayer [9] for an account under
very general settings.
The wealth account W (t), t ∈ [0, T ] over the lifetime of the GMWB contract is
invested into the index S, subject to management fees charged by a wealth manager at
the rate αm(t). An additional charge of insurance fees at rate αins(t) for the GMWB
rider is collected by the insurer to pay for the hedging cost of the guarantee. Both
fees are deterministic, time-dependent and continuously charged. Discrete fees may be
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modelled similarly without any difficulty. The wealth account in turn evolves as
dW (t) = W (t) ((r(t)− αtot(t))dt+ σ(t)dB(t)) , (2)
for any t ∈ [0, T ] at which no withdrawal of wealth is made. Here, αtot(t) = αins(t) +
αm(t) is the total fee rate. The GMWB contract allows the policyholder to withdraw
from a guarantee account A(t), t ∈ [0, T ] on a sequence of pre-determined contract event
dates, 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN = T . The initial guarantee A(0) usually matches the
initial wealth W (0). The guarantee account stays constant unless a withdrawal is made
on one of the event dates, which changes the guarantee account balance. We assume
that the GMWB contract will be taken over by the beneficiary if the policyholder
dies before the maturity T , so that no early termination of the contract is possible,
nor is there any death benefit included in the contract. Additional features such as
early surrender and death benefits can be included straightforwardly but will not be
considered in this article, in order to better illustrate the impact of management fees
without unnecessary complexities.
To simplify notations, we denote by X(t) the vector of state variables at t, given by
X(t) = (r(t), σ(t), S(t),W (t), A(t)), t ∈ [0, T ]. (3)
We denote by EQt [·] the risk-neutral expectation conditional on the state variables at
t, i.e., EQt [·] := EQ[·|X(t)]. Here, we assume that all state variables follow Markov
processes under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, so that X(t) contains all the
information available at t. For completeness, we include the index value S(t) in the
vector of state variables which under the current model may seem redundant, due to
the scale-invariance of the geometric Brownian motion type model (1). In general,
however, S(t) may determine the future dynamics of S in a nonlinear fashion, as is the
case under, e.g., the minimal market model described in Platen and Heath [23].
On event dates tn, n = 1, . . . , N − 1, the policyholder may choose to withdraw a
nominal amount γn ≤ A(tn). The real cash flow received by the policyholder is denoted
by Cn(γn,X(t
−
n )), where t
− refers to the time “just before” t. As a specific example,
Cn(γn,X(t
−
n )) may be given by
Cn(γn,X(t
−
n )) = γn − βmax(γn −Gn, 0), (4)
where the contractual withdrawal Gn is a pre-determined withdrawal amount specified
in the GMWB contract, and β is the penalty rate applied to the part of the withdrawal
exceeding the contractual withdrawal Gn. The policyholder may decide the withdrawal
amount γn based on all current state variables, i.e.,
γn = Γ(tn,X(t
−
n )), (5)
where the mapping Γ(·, ·) is defined as a withdrawal strategy. Given the assumed Marko-
vian structure of the state variables X, the withdrawal strategy (5) uses all current
information.
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Upon withdrawal, the guarantee account is changed by the amount Dn(γn,X(t
−
n )),
that is,
A(tn) = A(t
−
n )−Dn(γn,X(t−n )). (6)
For example, if Dn(γn,X(t
−
n )) = γn, then
A(tn) = A(t
−
n )− γn. (7)
The guarantee account stays nonnegative, that is, γn can only be taken such that
Dn(γn,X(t
−
n )) ≤ A(t−n ). The wealth account is reduced by the amount γn upon with-
drawal and remains nonnegative. That is,
W (tn) = max(W (t
−
n )− γn, 0), (8)
where W (t−n ) is the wealth account balance just before the withdrawal. It is assumed
that γ0 = 0, i.e., no withdrawals at the start of the contract.
The function of policyholder’s remaining value at time t is denoted by V (t,X(t)), t ∈
[0, T ], which corresponds to the risk-neutral value of all future cashflows to the policy-
holder at time t. At maturity tN = T , the policyholder obtains an liquidation cash flow
V (T−,X(T−)). Both account balances becomes zero at T , that is, W (T ) = A(T ) = 0.
For example, the liquidation cash flow may be given by
V (T−,X(T−)) = A(T−)− βmax(A(T−)−GN , 0) + max(W (T−)− A(T−), 0), (9)
which assumes a nominal withdrawal γN = A(T
−) of remaining guarantee account bal-
ance subject to a penalty implied by (4) with contract amount GN , plus the liquidation
of the wealth account after this withdrawal. Different contracts may define different
liquidation cash flows. We emphasize here that the analysis presented in this article
does not require this particular form (9). Note also that the liquidation cash flow either
does not depend on γN or the dependence is only formal, in that γN is always chosen
to maximize the liquidation cash flow.
3. The Policyholder’s Value Function
Having introduced the modeling framework and contract specifications, we can now
calculate the policyholder’s value function V (t,X(t)) as the risk-neutral expected value
of policyholder’s future cash flows at time t ∈ [0, T ]. Valuing the future cash flows under
the risk-neutral pricing approach assumes the policyholder’s cash flow may be replicated
by self-financing portfolios of the same initial value. Although the policyholder may
not have the resources to carry out any hedging strategies in person, we assume the
market is liquid enough to trade such strategies without frictions, and the policyholder
has access to the market through independent agents. Thus the risk-neutral valuation
of the policyholder’s future cash flows can be regarded as the value of the remaining
term of the VA contract from the poliyholer’s perspective.
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Following Section 2, for a given withdrawal strategy Γ, the jump condition at the
withdrawal time tn for the policyholder’s value function V (t,X(t)) is given by
V (t−n ,X(t
−
n )) = Cn(γn,X(t
−
n )) + V (tn,X(tn)), (10)
i.e., the remaining policy value just before the withdrawal is the sum of the cash flow
from the withdrawal and the remaining policy value immediately after the withdrawal.
Here, the withdrawal γn is given as (5) by applying the strategy of choice.
The policy value at t ∈ (tn−1, tn) is given by the discounted expected future policy
value under the risk-neutral probability measure as
V (t,X(t)) = EQt
[
e−
∫ tn
t r(s)dsV (t−n ,X(t
−
n ))
]
, (11)
where e−
∫ tn
t r(s)ds is the discount factor. The initial policy value, given by V (0,X(0)),
can be calculated backward in time starting from the terminal condtion V (T−,X(T−)),
using (10) and (11), as described in Algorithm 1.
As an illustrative example, we assume r(t) ≡ r, σ(t) ≡ σ and αtot(t) ≡ αtot as
constants, and thus V (t,X(t)) = V (t,W (t)) for t ∈ (tn−1, tn). We now derive the
partial differential equation (PDE) satisfied by the value function V through a hedging
argument. We consider a delta hedging portfolio that, at time t ∈ (tn−1, tn), takes a
long position of the value function V and a short position of W (t)∂WV (t,W (t))
S(t)
shares of
the index S. Here ∂WV (t,W (t)) ≡ ∂V (t,W )∂W |W=W (t) is the partial derivative of V (t,W )
with respect to the second argument, evaluated at W (t). Denoting the total value of
this portfolio at t ∈ (tn−1, tn) as ΠV (t), the value of the delta hedging portfolio is given
by
ΠV (t) = V (t,W (t))−W (t)∂WV (t,W (t)). (12)
By Ito’s formula and (1), the SDE for ΠV can be obtained as
dΠV (t) =
(
∂tV (t,W (t))− αtotW (t)∂WV (t,W (t)) + 12σ2W (t)2∂WWV (t,W (t))
)
dt,
(13)
for t ∈ (tn−1, tn). Since the hedging portfolio ΠV is locally riskless, it must grow at the
risk-free rate r, that is dΠV (t) = rΠV (t)dt. This along with (12) implies that the PDE
satisfied by the value function V (t,W ) is given by
∂tV − rV + (r − αtot)W∂WV + 1
2
σ2W 2∂WWV = 0, (14)
for t ∈ (tn−1, tn) and n = 1, . . . , N . The boundary conditions at tn are specified by
(9) and (10). The valuation formula (11) or the PDE (14) may be solved recursively
by following Algorithm 1 to compute the initial policy value V (0,X(0)). It should be
noted that (11) is general, and does not depend on the simplifying assumptions made
in the PDE derivation.
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Algorithm 1 Recursive computation of V (0,X(0))
1: choose a withdrawal strategy Γ
2: initialize V (T−,X(T−)), e.g., as (9)
3: set n = N
4: while n > 0 do
5: compute V (tn−1,X(tn−1)) by solving (11) or (14) with terminal condition
V (t−n ,X(t
−
n ))
6: compute the withdrawal amount γn−1 by applying the strategy Γ as (5)
7: compute V (t−n−1,X(t
−
n−1)) by applying jump condition (10)
8: n = n− 1
9: end while
4. The Insurer’s Liability Function and the Fair Fee Rate
The GMWB contract may be considered from the insurer’s perspective by examining
the insurer’s liabilities, given by the risk-neutral value of the cash flows that must be
paid by the insurer in order to fulfill the GMWB contract.
On any withdrawal date tn, the actual cash flow received by the policyholder is
given by (4). This cash flow is first paid out of the policyholder’s real withdrawal
from the wealth account, which is equal to min(W (t−n ), γn), the smaller of the nominal
withdrawal and the available wealth. If the wealth account has an insufficient balance,
the rest must be paid by the insurer. If the real withdrawal exceeds the cash flow
entitled to the policyholder, the insurer keeps the surplus. The payment made by the
insurer at tn is thus given by
cn(γn,X(t
−
n )) = Cn(γn,X(t
−
n ))−min(W (t−n ), γn). (15)
At any time t, we denote the net liability function as L(t,X(t)), which refers to the
risk-neutral value of all future payments made to the policyholder by the insurer, less
the present value of all future insurance fee incomes.
The insurance fees, charged at the rate αins(t), t ∈ [0, T ], is called fair if the total
fees exactly compensate for the insurer’s total liability, such that the net liability is zero
at time t = 0. That is,
L(0,X(0)) = 0. (16)
Note that L(0,X(0)) depends on αins(t), which was made implicit for notational sim-
plicity. If αins(t) ≡ αins is a constant, its value can be found by solving (16). The fair
insurance fees represent the hedging cost for the insurer to deliver the GMWB guar-
antee to the policyholder, which is often regarded as the value of the GMWB rider,
at least from the insurer’s perspective. We emphasize here that this value may not be
equal to the added value of the GMWB rider to the policyholder’s wealth account, as
we will show in Section 5.
To compute L(0,X(0)) we first note that at maturity T , the terminal condition on
L is given by
L(T−,X(T−)) = V (T−,X(T−))−W (T−), (17)
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i.e., the insurer must pay for any amount of the policyholder’s final value not covered
by the available wealth. Depending on the GMWB contract details, this amount can
be negative, in which case the insurer gets paid. This happens, for example, if the
liquidation cash flow is given by (9), and there are more penalties applied to the fi-
nal (compulsory) withdrawal due to forced liquidation of a high final balance of the
guarantee account. The jump condition on L at tn is given by
L(t−n ,X(t
−
n )) = cn(γn,X(t
−
n )) + L(tn,X(tn)), (18)
i.e., upon withdrawal, the net liability is reduced by the amount paid out.
At t ∈ (tn−1, tn), the net liability function is given by the risk-neutral value of the
remaining liabilities at tn before any benefit is paid, less any insurance fee incomes over
the period (t, tn), discounted at the risk-free rate. Specifically, we have
L(t,X(t)) = EQt
[
e−
∫ tn
t r(s)dsL(t−n ,W (t
−
n ), A(t
−
n ))
]
−EQt
[ ∫ tn
t
e−
∫ s
t r(u)duαins(s)W (s)ds
]
.
(19)
Note that the net liability, viewed from time t forward, is reduced by expecting to
receive insurance fees over (t, tn). Since this reduction decreases with time, the net
liability increases with time.
To give an example, we again assume constant r(t) ≡ r, σ(t) ≡ σ, αins(t) ≡ αins,
αtot(t) ≡ αtot. Under these simplifying assumptions we have L(t,X(t)) = L(t,W (t)),
for t ∈ (tn−1, tn). To derive the PDE satisfied by L(t,W ), consider a delta hedging
portfolio that, at time t ∈ (tn−1, tn), consists of a long position in the net liability
function L and a short position of W (t)∂WL(t,W (t))
S(t)
shares of the index S. The value of
the delta hedging portfolio, denoted as ΠL(t), is given by
ΠL(t) = L(t,W (t))−W (t)∂WL(t,W (t)). (20)
By Ito’s formula and (1), we obtain the SDE for ΠL as
dΠL(t) =
(
∂tL(t,W (t))− αtotW (t)∂WL(t,W (t)) + 12σ2W (t)2∂WWL(t,W (t))
)
dt,
(21)
where t ∈ (tn−1, tn). Since the hedging portfolio ΠL is locally riskless and must grow at
the risk-free rate r, as well as increase with the insurance fee income at rate αinsW (t)
(see remarks after (19)), we must also have dΠL(t) =
(
rΠL(t) + αinsW (t)
)
dt. This
along with (20) implies that the PDE satisfied by the value function L(t,W ) is given
by
∂tL− αinsW − rL+ (r − αtot)W∂WL+ 1
2
σ2W 2∂WWL = 0, (22)
for t ∈ (tn−1, tn). The initial net liability can thus be computed by recursively solving
(19) or (22) from terminal and jump conditions (17) and (18), as described in Algorithm
2.
9
Algorithm 2 Recursive computation of L(0,X(0))
1: choose a withdrawal strategy Γ
2: initialize L(T−,X(T−)) as (17)
3: set n = N
4: while n > 0 do
5: compute L(tn−1,X(tn−1)) by solving (19) or (22) with terminal condition
L(t−n ,X(t
−
n ))
6: compute the withdrawal amount γn−1 by applying the strategy Γ as (5)
7: compute L(t−n−1,X(t
−
n−1)) by applying jump condition (18)
8: n = n− 1
9: end while
5. Policy Value Maximization vs Liability Maximization
In the previous sections, the withdrawal strategy γn, n = 1, . . . , n − 1 has been
assumed to be given. The withdrawal strategy serves as a control sequence affecting
the policyholder’s value function and the insurer’s liability function. These withdrawals
may thus be chosen to maximize either of these functions, leading to two distinct
withdrawal strategies. In this section we formulate these two strategies and discuss
their relations. In particular, we point out the role of management fees in the relations
between the strategies and the implications.
5.1. Formulation of two optimization problems
We first formulate the policyholder’s value maximization problem, i.e., maximiz-
ing the initial policy value V (0,X(0)) by optimally choosing the sequence γn for n =
1, . . . , N − 1. Following the principle of dynamic programming, this is accomplished by
choosing the withdrawal γn as
γn = Γ
V (tn,X(t
−
n )) = arg max
γ∈A
{
Cn(γ,X(t
−
n )) + V
(
tn,X(tn|X(t−n ), γ)
)}
(23)
in the admissible setA = {γ : γ ≥ 0, A(tn|X(t−n ), γ) ≥ 0}. Here, we used X(tn|X(t−n ), γ)
and A(tn|X(t−n ), γ) to denote the state variables X(tn) and A(tn) at tn after withdrawal
γ is made, given the value of the state variables X(t−n ) before the withdrawal. At any
withdrawal time tn the policyholder chooses the withdrawal γ ∈ A to maximize the
sum of the cash flow he receives and the present value of the remaining term of the
policy. The strategy ΓV given by (23) is called the value maximization strategy.
On the other hand, the optimization problem from the insurer’s perspective con-
siders the most unfavourable situation for the insurer. That is, by making suitable
choices of γn’s, the policyholder attempts to maximize the net initial liability function
L(0,X(0)). Even though a policyholder has little reason to pursue such a strategy, the
fair fee rate under this strategy is guaranteed to cover the hedging cost of the GMWB
rider regardless of the withdrawal strategy of the policyholder (assuming the insurer
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can perfectly hedge the market risks). The withdrawal γn for this strategy is given by
γn = Γ
L(tn,X(t
−
n )) = arg max
γ∈A
{
cn(γ,X(t
−
n )) + L
(
tn,X(tn|X(t−n ), γ)
)}
, (24)
i.e., the sum of the cash flow paid by the insurer and the net liability of the remaining
term of the contract is maximized. The strategy ΓL given by (24) is called the liability
maximization strategy.
5.2. The role of management fees
To clarify the different implications on the fair insurance fees between the value
and the liability maximization strategies, we now establish the relationship between
the policy value V and the net liability L by defining the process
M(t,X(t)) := L(t,X(t)) +W (t)− V (t,X(t)), (25)
for t ∈ [0, T ]. From (17) we obtain
M(T−,X(T−)) = 0, (26)
as the terminal condition for M . From (11) and (19) we find the recursive relation for
M as,
M(t,X(t)) = EQt
[
e−
∫ tn
t r(s)dsM(t−n ,X(t
−
n ))
]
+W (t)− EQt [W (t−n )]
−EQt
[∫ tn
t
e−
∫ s
t r(u)duαins(s)W (s)ds
]
.
(27)
Note that the second and third lines in (27) can be identified with the time-t risk-neutral
value of management fees over (t, tn). To see this, we first note that the difference of the
first two terms is the time-t risk-neutral value of the total fees charged on the wealth
account over (t, tn), and the expectation in the third term is the time-t risk-neutral
value of the insurance fees over the same period.
In lights of (26) and (27), the quantity M(t,X(t)) defined by (25) is precisely the
time-t risk-neutral value of future management fees. From (25), the policy value may
be written as
V (t,X(t)) = W (t) + L(t,X(t))−M(t,X(t)), (28)
i.e., the sum of the wealth and the value of the GMWB rider, less the value of future
management fees. At t = 0, this gives
V (0,X(0)) +M(0,X(0)) = W (0) + L(0,X(0)). (29)
Therefore, maximizing L(0,X(0)) in general is not the same as maximizing V (0,X(0)),
since the total management fee M(0,X(0)) depends on the withdrawal strategy. The
fair fee condition (16) becomes
V (0,X(0)) +M(0,X(0)) = W (0), (30)
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as in contrast to the V (0) = W (0) condition often seen in the literature, when no man-
agement fees are charged, in which case the two strategies ΓV and ΓL coincide. When
the management fee rate is positive, the liability maximization strategy ΓL by definition
leads to the maximal initial net liability, thus by (16) the maximal fair insurance fee
rate.
5.3. Implications
We now consider the two strategies in an idealized world where the policy value
and the net liability processes can be perfectly replicated using self-financing trading
strategies. As is mentioned above, assuming that the fair insurance fee follows from the
liability maximization strategy, the insurer is guaranteed a nonnegative profit, regard-
less of the actual withdrawal strategies of the policyholder. If the policyholder behaves
differently from this strategy, in particular, if he follows the value maximization strat-
egy, the insurer generally makes a positive profit.
On the other hand, consider the situation where the policyholder purchases his policy
from a middle agent, who in turn purchases the same policy for the same price from an
insurer in the name of the policyholder, and handles withdrawals at his own choice, but
fulfills any withdrawal requests from the policyholder according to the GMWB contract.
In other words, the middle agent provides the GMWB guarantee to the policyholder,
and follows the value maximization strategy when making his own withdrawals from
the insurer. Then regardless of the policyholder’s withdrawal behavior or the fees, the
middle agent always makes a nonnegative profit. If the policyholder behaves differently
from the policy value maximization strategy, she receives a value less than the maximal
policy value received by the agent, who therefore makes a positive profit out of the
suboptimal behavior of the policyholder. Given that the middle agent will carry out
withdrawals that would maximize the value rather than the cost to the insurer, the
insurer in turn can afford to charge a less expensive fee than those implied by the
liability maximization strategy, leading to more value for the middle agent and the
policyholder. The seemingly win-win situation come at the loss of the wealth manager,
who now expect to receive less management fees. In this case the middle agent in effect
reduces the market frictions represented by the management fees by maximizing his
own value, and at the same time help improving the policyholder’s value.
6. Numerical Examples
To demonstrate the impact of management fees on the fair fees of GMWB contracts,
we carry out in this section several numerical experiments. We investigate how the
presence of management fees will lead to different fair fees for the two withdrawal
strategies studied in previous sections under different market conditions and contract
parameters.
6.1. Setup of the experiments
For illustration purposes, we assume a simple GMWB contract as specified by (4),
(7), (9) as well as constant r, σ, αm and αins so that the PDEs (14) and (22) are valid.
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We consider different contractual scenarios and calculate the fair fees implied by (16)
under the withdrawal strategies given in Section 5.
It is assumed that the wealth and the guarantee accounts start at W (0) = A(0) = 1.
The maturities of the contracts range from 5 to 20 years, with annual contractual
withdrawals evenly distributed over the lifetime of the contracts. The first withdrawal
occurs at the end of the first year and the last at the maturity. The management fee
rate ranges from 0% up to 2%.
We consider several investment environments with the risk-free rate r at levels 1%
and 5%, and the volatility of the index σ at 10% and 30%, to represent different market
conditions such as low/high growth and low/high volatility scenarios. In addition, the
penalty rate β may take values at 10% or 20%.
We compute the initial policy value V (0,X(0)) as well as the initial net liability
L(0,X(0)) at time 0 numerically by following Algorithms 1 and 2 simultaneously. The
withdrawal strategies ΓL and ΓV are considered separately. The PDEs (14) and (22) are
solved using Crank-Nicholson finite difference method (Crank and Nicolson [7], Hirsa
[12]) with appropriate terminal and jump conditions for both functions under both
strategies. This leads to the initial values and liabilities V (0,X(0); ΓL), L(0,X(0); ΓL),
V (0,X(0); ΓV ) and L(0,X(0); ΓV ) under both strategies. Here, we made the depen-
dence of these functions on the strategies explicit.
The fair fee rates under both strategies were obtained by solving (16) using a stan-
dard root-finding numerical scheme. Note that in the existing literature, Forsyth and
Vetzal [10] considered only the strategy ΓL and computed the “total value”, equivalent
to V (0,X(0); ΓL)+M(0,X(0); ΓL), and obtained the fair fee rate by requiring this total
value to be equal to W (0), the initial investment, which is the same as requiring the
initial liability to be equal to 0 as indicated by (16).
6.2. Results and implications
The fair fees and corresponding total policy values are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for
two market conditions: a low return market with high volatility (r = 1%, σ = 30%) and
a high return market with low volatility (r = 5%, σ = 10%), respectively. Fair fee rates
obtained for all market conditions and contract parameters can be found in Tables 1
and 2. The corresponding policy values are listed in Tables 3 and 4.
The first observation to note from these numerical results is that the fair fee rate
implied by the liability maximization strategy is always higher, and the corresponding
policyholder’s total value always lower, than those implied by the value maximization
strategy, unless management fees are absent, in which case these quantities are equal.
These are to be expected from the definitions of the two strategies.
We also observe from these numerical results that, under the market condition of
low return with high volatility, a much higher insurance fee rate is required than under
the market condition of high return with low volatility, for the obvious reason that
under adverse market conditions, the guarantee is more valuable. Moreover, a higher
penalty rate results in a lower insurance fee since a higher penalty rate discourages
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the policyholder from making more desirable withdrawals that exceed the contracted
values.
Furthermore, the results show that under most market conditions or contract spec-
ifications, the fair insurance fee rate obtained is highly sensitive to the management fee
rate regardless of the withdrawal strategies, as seen from Figures 1 and 2. In partic-
ular, the fair fee rate implied by the liability maximization strategy always increases
with the management fee rate, since the management fees cause the wealth account to
decrease, leading to higher liability for the insurer to fulfill. On the other hand, the fair
fee rate implied by the value maximization strategy first increases then decreases with
the management fee rate, since at high management fee rates, a rational policyholder
tends to withdraw more and early to avoid the management fees, which in turn reduces
the liability and generates more penalty incomes for the insurer.
A major insight from the numerical results is that with increasing management fees,
the value maximization withdrawals of a rational policyholder deviates more from the
liability maximization withdrawals assumed by the insurer. In particular, it is seen by
examining Figures 1 and 2 that the fair fee rates implied by the two strategies differ
more significantly under the following conditions:
• longer maturity T ,
• lower penalty rate β,
• higher index return r, and
• higher management fee rate αm.
Moreover, careful examination of results listed in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the index
volatility σ does not seem to contribute significantly to this discrepancy. These obser-
vations are intuitively reasonable: The contributors listed above all imply that the total
management fees M(0) will be higher. There are more incentives to withdraw early to
achieve more values in the form of reduced management fees. The corresponding differ-
ences between the policyholder’s values follow similar patterns. Of particular interest
is that in some cases, as shown in Figure 2, the fair fee rate implied by maximizing
policyholder’s value can become negative. This implies that the policyholder would
want to withdraw more and early due to high management fees to such an extent, that
the penalties incurred exceed the total value of the GMWB rider. On the other hand,
the fair fee rate implied by maximizing the liability is always positive.
7. Conclusions
Determining accurate hedging costs of VA guarantees is a significant issue for VA
providers. While the presence of management fees is typically ignored in the VA liter-
ature, it was demonstrated in this article that the impact of management fees on the
pricing of GMWB contract is significant. As a form of market friction similar to tax
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consideration, management fees can affect policyholders’ withdrawal behaviors, caus-
ing large deviations from the “optimal” (liability maximization) withdrawal behaviors
often assumed in the literature.
Two different policyholder’s withdrawal strategies were considered: liability maxi-
mization and value maximization when management fees are present. We demonstrated
that these two withdrawal strategies imply different fair insurance fee rates, where max-
imizing policy value implies lower fair fees than those implied by maximizing liability,
or equivalently, maximizing the “total value” of the contract, which represents the
maximal hedging costs from the insurer’s perspective.
More importantly, we quantitatively demonstrated that the difference between the
initial investment and the total value of the policyholder is precisely the total value
of the management fees, which is also the cause of the discrepancy between the two
withdrawal strategies considered in this article. The two strategies coincide when man-
agement fees are absent. We identified a number of factors that contribute to this
discrepancy through a series of illustrating numerical experiments. Our findings iden-
tify the management fees as a potential cause of discrepancy between the fair fee rates
implied by the liability maximization strategy, often assumed from the insurer’s per-
spective for VA pricing, and the prevailing market rates for VA contracts with GMWB
or similar riders.
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Figure 1: Fair insurance fee rates and policy values as a function of management fee rates αm for risk-
free rate r = 1% and volatility σ = 30%, for penalty rates β = 10% , 20% and maturities T = 5 , 10 , 20
years. The left axis and dark plots refer to the fair fees in percentage; The right axis and gray plots
refer to the policy values. Legends across all plots are shown in the upper left panel.
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Figure 2: Fair insurance fee rates and policy values as a function of management fee rates αm for risk-
free rate r = 5% and volatility σ = 10%, for penalty rates β = 10% , 20% and maturities T = 5 , 10 , 20
years. The left axis and dark plots refer to the fair fees in percentage; The right axis and gray plots
refer to the policy values. Legends across all plots are shown in the upper left panel.
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Table 1: Fair fee rate αins (%) based on the liability maximization strategy Γ
L.
Parameters αm
r(%) σ(%) β(%) T 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2%
1 10 10 5 3.08 3.48 3.96 4.59 5.41 6.65 8.66 12.18 17.67 23.53 29.92
10 1.66 1.92 2.25 2.66 3.21 3.97 5.08 6.77 9.26 12.17 15.31
20 0.82 0.97 1.17 1.43 1.77 2.22 2.83 3.68 4.81 6.19 7.71
20 5 3.08 3.47 3.95 4.55 5.34 6.48 8.39 12.01 17.66 23.55 29.92
10 1.66 1.91 2.23 2.62 3.13 3.83 4.88 6.60 9.20 12.17 15.31
20 0.81 0.96 1.16 1.40 1.71 2.13 2.72 3.57 4.74 6.17 7.71
30 10 5 15.05 15.92 16.92 18.02 19.27 20.70 22.37 24.43 26.88 29.91 33.69
10 8.38 8.93 9.55 10.22 10.98 11.85 12.84 13.98 15.34 16.93 18.81
20 4.32 4.64 5.00 5.41 5.87 6.39 6.98 7.66 8.45 9.35 10.37
20 5 13.99 14.82 15.73 16.80 18.01 19.40 21.06 23.11 25.64 28.86 32.95
10 7.85 8.38 8.97 9.63 10.36 11.22 12.22 13.38 14.74 16.43 18.41
20 4.00 4.33 4.69 5.10 5.55 6.07 6.66 7.34 8.11 9.01 10.02
5 10 10 5 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.88 0.96
10 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.43
20 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22
20 5 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.88 0.96
10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.35
20 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12
30 10 5 5.33 5.48 5.65 5.81 5.99 6.17 6.35 6.55 6.75 6.96 7.17
10 2.91 3.02 3.12 3.23 3.35 3.47 3.60 3.73 3.86 4.01 4.16
20 1.58 1.65 1.74 1.82 1.91 2.00 2.10 2.21 2.32 2.43 2.55
20 5 4.97 5.13 5.28 5.44 5.61 5.79 5.97 6.15 6.35 6.55 6.76
10 2.27 2.35 2.43 2.52 2.61 2.71 2.81 2.91 3.02 3.13 3.25
20 1.08 1.13 1.19 1.24 1.31 1.37 1.43 1.50 1.58 1.65 1.73
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Table 2: Fair fee rate αins (%) based on the policy value maximization strategy Γ
V .
Parameters αm
r(%) σ(%) β(%) T 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2%
1 10 10 5 3.08 3.47 3.96 4.57 5.36 6.57 8.55 12.12 17.66 23.55 29.93
10 1.66 1.92 2.23 2.61 3.13 3.81 4.86 6.44 8.99 12.11 15.30
20 0.82 0.96 1.09 1.21 1.33 1.44 1.50 1.59 1.65 1.70 1.81
20 5 3.08 3.47 3.95 4.55 5.34 6.48 8.38 12.01 17.66 23.55 29.92
10 1.66 1.91 2.23 2.62 3.12 3.80 4.84 6.56 9.19 12.17 15.31
20 0.81 0.96 1.16 1.39 1.67 2.05 2.60 3.43 4.65 6.14 7.70
30 10 5 15.05 15.92 16.91 18.00 19.25 20.66 22.32 24.34 26.79 29.80 33.58
10 8.38 8.93 9.53 10.19 10.93 11.77 12.72 13.81 15.11 16.65 18.51
20 4.32 4.63 4.94 5.27 5.59 5.90 6.20 6.49 6.76 6.99 7.16
20 5 13.99 14.82 15.73 16.80 18.00 19.39 21.04 23.09 25.62 28.84 32.93
10 7.85 8.38 8.96 9.62 10.35 11.20 12.19 13.34 14.70 16.38 18.37
20 4.00 4.32 4.68 5.08 5.53 6.04 6.61 7.27 8.04 8.92 9.95
5 10 10 5 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.80
10 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.07 -0.02 -0.14 -0.26
20 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.23 -0.37 -0.51 -0.64 -0.79 -0.93
20 5 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.88 0.96
10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26
20 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.00 -0.10 -0.24 -0.38 -0.53
30 10 5 5.33 5.48 5.64 5.79 5.95 6.11 6.27 6.43 6.60 6.75 6.94
10 2.91 3.01 3.10 3.18 3.26 3.34 3.41 3.47 3.53 3.58 3.60
20 1.58 1.64 1.68 1.72 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.74 1.74 1.73 1.71
20 5 4.97 5.13 5.28 5.44 5.61 5.78 5.96 6.14 6.32 6.51 6.70
10 2.27 2.35 2.43 2.51 2.59 2.67 2.74 2.82 2.88 2.94 3.00
20 1.08 1.13 1.18 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.21 1.18 1.14 1.09
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Table 3: Total policy value V (0,X(0); ΓL) based on the liability maximization strategy ΓL.
Parameters αm
r(%) σ(%) β(%) T 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2%
1 10 10 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90
30 10 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91
20 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
5 10 10 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90
20 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.82
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89
20 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.80
30 10 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93
20 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.83
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Table 4: Total policy value V (0,X(0); ΓV ) based on the policy value maximization strategy ΓV .
Parameters αm
r(%) σ(%) β(%) T 0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2%
1 10 10 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90
30 10 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93
20 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
10 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
5 10 10 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90
20 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86
30 10 5 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
20 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93
20 5 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
10 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92
20 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88
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